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Abstract. The lack of any explicit engagement with art and aesthetics, coupled with his 
strong rationalism and naturalism, has led to the claim that the philosophy of Spinoza is 
actively “hostile” to art. Contrary to these claims, this essay brings together certain key 
principles of Spinozism and a poem by futurist poet Mina Loy. I argue that when viewed 
under Spinoza’s ontology of power and through his relational theory of the individual, 
works of art and literature emerge as particularly active sites of relation that are both 
constitutive of, and constituted by, the wider affective field within which they find 
themselves.  
 
 
While the work of Benedict de Spinoza has been a source of inspiration and 
curiosity for a variety of literary and artistic figures,1 his grounding philosophical 
principles are often cited as a hindrance for a productive engagement with art and 
art theory. Certain commentators cite Spinoza’s “naturalism” and “rationalism” as 
reasons for his philosophy’s “hostility” to art and culture.2 But these criticisms 
only prevail if: (i) one holds that works of art and literature ought to have an 
ontological ground other than the natural (i.e., a reinstatement of the nature-
culture dualism), and (ii) if art and literature are given in opposition to reason and 
rationality. In contrast to such studies that focus on the potential ontological and 
epistemic problems that Spinoza’s philosophy raises for art and literary theory, 
this essay considers a work of art—in this case a poem—through certain 
principles that are central to Spinoza’s philosophy.  
This essay therefore does not explain a work of literature in Spinozistic 
terms, nor does it attempt to find Spinozistic ideas in a literary work. Rather, this 
essay situates the work of art in a Spinozist theoretical framework and asks what 
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a particular literary work does. More specifically, this article treats Mina Loy’s 
poem “Brancusi’s Golden Bird” as an individual in the sense of the word outlined 
in Spinoza’s philosophy, and asks: What are the effects of “Brancusi’s Golden Bird” 
and what relations does it, as an active and reactive individual, set in motion? To 
this extent my piece functions as an ethology of a poem, and it suggests a Spinozist 
understanding of “Brancusi’s Golden Bird” that highlights its effectivity, 
mutability, and heightened capacity for generating relations in the world. 
 
I 
As Spinoza presents our experience of things such as decoration, music, 
and theater in Ethics IVP45Schol,3 works of art and culture and our experience of 
them is first and foremost affective, understood as a relation of utility between 
two or more individuals. For Spinoza, the wise person must take pleasure in 
decoration, theater, music, and “other things of this kind” in order that the body 
be nourished and the mind be capable of understanding many things at once 
(IVP45Schol). This claim on the use value of cultural experience follows from 
Spinoza’s wider metaphysics of power whereby all the affective relations an 
individual undergoes are either an aid (joyful affects) or a hindrance (sad affects) 
to the striving power that constitutes its actual essence (IIIP6-8).  
What occurs when two things meet and affect each other is an exchange of 
power whereby out of the relation, each thing emerges newly constituted at an 
essential level. Moreover, each relation and exchange of power that occurs 
between individual things is unique (IIPDA1”) and cannot be subsumed under a 
universal term that seeks to categorize such a relation. The affective relation that 
is my reading of Loy’s “Brancusi’s Golden Bird” this morning will be different to 
my reading the same poem next week, or even this evening. The way the poem 
and I affect and reconstitute one another’s power will change according to the 
mutable conditions within which our relation takes place. Hence Spinoza is keen 
to undermine the various structures and universal images that might obscure an 
understanding of these primary affective relations, such as that between poem 
and person, that all things enter into and take as the ground to their individuation. 
This is why Spinoza states (in IVP45Schol) that only “a savage and sad 
superstation” forbids pleasure, for the latter is only a modification of the affect 
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joy—an increase in our power to strive—and should not be judged through a 
signifying regime that obscures the knowledge of the positivity inherent in the 
primary affect of joy (see also IIIP11Schol). The universal, therefore, should not 
be the way through which we understand the particular affective experiences of 
an individual (IIP40Schol).  
This critique of universal and normative prescriptions is most evident in 
Spinoza’s critique of moral normativity, taken up and elucidated with particular 
acuity by Gilles Deleuze.4 Specifically, Deleuze distinguishes between an “Ethics,” 
which he understands as a typology of immanent modes of existence, and a 
“Morality,” which always refers immanent relations to a series of transcendent 
values (SPP, p. 23). On Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, a system of morality obscures 
the immanent and affective relations of bodies by “judging” them according to a 
fixed set of values that seek to organize and stratify. To judge singular relations by 
way of universal standards will serve only to obscure our knowledge of things and 
stymie the organization of encounters that are truly productive for our striving. 
As Deleuze notes, “Life is poisoned by the categories of Good and Evil” (p. 26),  
since these and other categories obstruct a lived form of experimentation that 
leads each to a knowledge of the particular relations that are truly productive for 
their striving. 
But while Spinoza’s critique of universal and normative prescriptions is 
most often cached out in terms of morality and notions of good and evil, it also 
extends into the realm of aesthetic considerations, with Spinoza noting that when 
one makes a judgment of beauty or perfection, the perceiver inadequately 
universalizes through an idea what is always only a singular and changeable 
relation between bodies. As Spinoza notes, beauty is merely an inadequate idea of 
the affect joy; to name something as beautiful is to misattribute the productive 
motions of the object that are presented to the nervous system through sensation, 
as a fixed predicate of the perceived object (IApp). Likewise, the aesthetic 
judgment of perfection is said to follow from an inadequate idea that is composed 
in the imagination of the judging individual, and which bears no relation to the 
body of the object judged perfect or imperfect (IVApp). Here the aesthetic 
judgment of beauty or perfection seeks to universalize a singular bodily relation 
into a fixed idea of those relations and, in so doing, functions only to obscure the 
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immanent relations of bodies that constantly vary according to the changeable 
conditions in which the relations takes place.  
It follows, then, that to take an inadequate idea of the beautiful into our 
affective relation with a work of art, to seek the idea of beauty in a body before a 
primary affective relation has taken place, is for the perceiver of an artwork to 
look for order and fixity beyond the immanence and variability of bodily relations. 
To seek beauty in bodies or harmony in the heavens is to search for depth in 
surface, the incorporeal in the corporeal, and fixity in flux. At one time a particular 
poem may be conducive in making “productive motions” and the joyful affects that 
follow (IApp), but in another time and under different circumstances that same 
poem may be deemed ugly and be debilitating for the individual’s striving. Neither 
of these affective relations with the poem is known in any certainty before the 
relation takes place; only through the experience of the poem will the reader or 
listener affirm either a positive or negative affective experience. To predetermine 
a type of relation between bodies is to ascribe an inherent predicate or disposition 
to both subject and object, and hold that the predicate, such as the positive 
sensorial effect we call beauty, is fixed and unchanging and will occur in the same 
way in each subsequent relation.  
But for Spinoza any such universal determination, such as the inadequate 
idea of a thing’s beauty or ugliness, is to misunderstand the relational variability 
of two striving individuals that are always in a continuous state of change. To 
ascribe a fixed value outside of the immanent and changeable relations of things 
is to block the possibility of new and varying experiences by which we can know 
something of our continually shifting selves, and this holds equally for the 
aesthetic sphere as it does for the moral. As Rainer Maria Rilke notes on the 
experience of viewing a painting by Paul Cézanne: “I can tell how I’ve changed by 
the way Cézanne is challenging me now.”5 Rilke’s relation with the Cézanne elicits 
a change in his power by which he is able to measure his continuously varying 
person at that point in time. A painting by Cézanne challenges viewers and forces 
them to reveal their present disposition in affective experience, which cannot be 
predetermined or subsumed under general terms, for it will always be different to 
the multiplicity of past and future experiences the viewer has both undergone and 
will undergo. As Gatens and Lloyd note on the Spinozist critique of normative 
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modes of experience: we cannot know, “ahead of observation and 
experimentation, what are the capacities of this or that being, or the powers which 
it may come to possess.” 6  I cannot know in advance how I will emerge from 
viewing a Cézanne or reading “Brancusi’s Golden Bird”; only in my varying 
experiences of them will I glean something about my continuously mutating 
person. 
Following Spinoza, then, an affective relation, such as that between person 
and poem, ought not to be fixed under an idea that stands as a general 
representation of an always-singular relation, for such a representation arises 
“more from prejudice than from true knowledge of those things” (IVApp) and only 
serves to block the various new forms of relation that an artwork might engender. 
Rather, when entering into a relationship with a work of art, the Spinozist viewer, 
reader, or listener should aim to undermine the various habitual dispositions, 
arising from moral, aesthetic, or art historical structures, that obstruct our various 
potential relationships with, and experiences of, poems, paintings, and 
performances. 
On these grounds of a critique of normativity, Deleuze describes Spinoza’s 
Ethics as an “ethology,” that is, a form of inquiry that considers things not through 
their correspondence to a proper name—be that name a species, genus, historical 
movement, or cultural determination—but through their capacity to affect and be 
affected. An ethology, then, asks after the effects of an individual; an ethology does 
not refer individuals to a series of preestablished values and categories but seeks 
to understand them through their activity, through the effects they give rise to as 
active and reactive individuals. It is in this respect that Deleuze and Guattari claim 
in A Thousand Plateaus that under Spinozism a workhorse might be understood to 
be more similar to an ox than it is to a racehorse.7 The authors interpret Spinoza 
as holding that the particular degree of animation, the particular capacity to affect 
and be affected, is the determining factor of an individual, and not the 
correspondence to a proper name or abstract idea. For Spinoza, things must be 
understood through their particular degree of affective power and never in 
relation to a kind. To judge an individual by correspondence to an idea such as 
“man” or “horse” is, in Spinoza’s words, to seek to “explain natural things by mere 
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images of things” (IIP40Schol1) and not to consider them via their own particular 
nature, that is, via their unique capacity to act in the world. 
The understanding of ethology visible in Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of 
Spinoza is sensitive to the Ethics’ critique of modes of experience that proceed 
from universal ideas, such as the ideas of good and evil from which we 
inadequately measure our actions. In the same manner, an ethological aesthetics 
suggests that, rather than proceeding from a given set of ideas or proper names, 
our experience and understanding of a work of art would be better placed if they 
proceeded from the complex of affective relations that the work of art gives rise 
to. To think art representationally, through a consideration of what idea its body 
points to outside itself, risks foreclosing the multiple affective possibilities that a 
performance or poem might set in motion. As Gatens and Lloyd noted above on 
the idea of an ethology: We cannot know “ahead of observation and 
experimentation” what situations and experiences a work of art might give rise to.  
And so, before asking what Loy’s poem “Brancusi’s Golden Bird” refers to 
outside of itself—what does this word signify, this sentence correspond to, this 
negative space indicate?—an ethology of the poem will ask: What are the effects of 
its body? What has taken place in the experience of the poem and what is left of 
the body of both poem and perceiver after their relation? In this respect Loy’s 
poem is particularly significant because it is a poem whose subject refers the 
reader to a sculpture, to Constantin Brancusi’s Golden Bird,8 and hence it sets up a 
tripartite relationship between poet and sculpture, poem and reader, and reader 
and sculpture. I suggest that the particular effectiveness of Loy’s poem—what 
Loy’s poem does—lies in this increased ability to give rise to, and augment, 
affective relations. 
The first relation that this poem calls forth—that between poet and 
sculpture—is expressed in the poem itself. The second relation—that between 
poem and reader—is a meditation on the relationship between sculpture and poet 
but it is also setting up a new relationship between poem and reader. The third 
relation is between Brancusi’s sculpture and the reader of the poem.  
In what follows I consider the nonlinear complex of relations that Loy’s 
poem gives rise to. I attempt to unfold the complexity of relations that works of 
art and literature in general engender, how artistic bodies can accrue an increased 
 7 
degree of affectivity over time, and finally how Loy’s poem itself might be seen as 
a truly Spinozistic encounter with a work of art. To this extent the artistic body, 
whether poem, sculpture, performance, or intervention is understood through its 
existence as an acutely active site of relation and, I argue, it is exactly within this 
increased capacity for relation that lies its particularity as a work of art.9  
 
II 
A certain relationship of causality between Loy and Brancusi’s sculpture 
Golden Bird gives rise to what might be called an artistic effect, that is, a poem: Loy 
is disposed by Golden Bird to compose a poem that she entitles “Brancusi’s Golden 
Bird.” Considered under a Spinozist ontology, the cause-effect relationship 
between substance and modes, as well as that between modes themselves, is not 
one of difference or distinction but one of relationality.10 In Spinoza’s ontology the 
cause is never really distinct from its effect, but to some extent participates in the 
cause’s being insofar as the latter is always relationally determined in its 
individuality through the effects it has in the world.11 In the same manner Loy’s 
poem, which is the effect of Brancusi’s sculpture, never becomes really distinct 
from its cause but rather participates to a greater or lesser degree in the 
sculpture’s individuality. Put differently, Loy enters into a relationship with the 
sculpture and then participates in the latter’s individuation through the writing of 
her poem.  
How does this occur? Firstly, it occurs at a very basic level. For Spinoza the 
existence of an individual, be that a person, poem, or planet, is always bound up 
with both the causes that brought it to be and the effects that it has in the world 
as a necessarily active cause. An individual cannot be if it is not caused to exist by 
some previous thing (IP28), but it will equally cease to exist if it stops having 
effects in the world. Hence Spinoza ends part 1 of the Ethics with one of the most 
important propositions of his ontology: Nothing exists from whose nature some 
effect does not follow (IP36). This proposition writes activity into the definition of 
a thing’s existence, and this activity qua existence of the individual is always 
constituted through the effects that it has in the world. Insofar as the individuality 
of a thing is bound up with the effects it has in the world, then the effects it gives 
rise to will be a measure of the activity, and thus the very being qua power 
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(IIIP7Dem), of the thing that they are the effects of. All individuals rely on being 
the cause of effects to sustain their being and define themselves in their 
individuality, and in being an effect of Brancusi’s sculpture Loy’s poem actively 
participates in the former’s individuality by being a mark of the sculpture’s 
activity.  
This is the first sense in which the effect is always expressive of the 
individuality of its cause and therefore the first sense in which Loy’s poem can be 
understood to have participated in the being of Brancusi’s sculpture. But as well 
as this first sense I want to suggest a stronger sense in which Loy’s poem can be 
said to participate in Golden Bird. The question then becomes: to what extent is 
Loy’s poem involved in the individuality of Brancusi’s sculpture and what does 
this reveal about the possibilities of literary-artistic experience and creation? 
In the first instance, what Loy’s poem reveals to us is negative: when 
experiencing Brancusi’s sculpture Loy does not mediate her relation to it through 
ideas that are extrinsic to the initial relation between her and sculpture. Rather, 
Loy aims to preserve, extend, and complicate the primary affective relation set up 
between herself and the sculpture by responding to its presence in kind. Here I 
want to cite Spinoza’s insistence in the Theological-Political Treatise12 that the 
Holy Scriptures cannot be properly measured or understood through methods 
that are foreign to their own production. Going against Maimonides’s rationalist 
interpretation of scripture, and against those theologians who sought to explain 
what is natural by appeal to the supernatural, Spinoza claims that scripture must 
be taken in its materiality, and read and explained in the same way that it was 
produced, that is, via the logic of affectivity and the operations of the prophetic 
imagination (TPT, ch. 1, p. 20). One cannot understand the narratives and miracles 
of scripture via the principles of reason, for to do so is to impose external models 
onto what must be taken, according to Warren Montag, in the materiality of its 
letter and through its immanent affectivity (BMP, p. 21).  
In a similar way to how we ought to understand scripture under Spinoza’s 
biblical hermeneutics, so Loy does not choose to respond to Brancusi’s sculpture 
through a model of thought foreign to the sculpture. She does not compose a piece 
of criticism that measures or explains the body of the sculpture via normative 
aesthetic, cultural, or historical standards, for the latter would explain away the 
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sculpture and operate only to limit its capacity to generate new and as-yet-
unknown affects. Rather, Loy responds in kind to Golden Bird via the logic of 
affectivity and the materiality of her poetics. Loy does not ask or aim to 
communicate what Brancusi’s sculpture is about, what its reasons for existing are; 
she does not make a claim of universality upon its body and nor does she ask what 
it might eternally be said to represent. Instead, her poem appears as the 
immanent, unmediated, and affective response to Brancusi’s bird that, through 
taking up certain of the sculpture’s affective motivations, constitutes, extends, and 
alters the latter’s body through its own active individuality. By being an effect of 
Golden Bird that expresses the sculpture’s existence, Loy’s poem participates in 
Golden Bird’s individuality. But Loy’s poem also extends Golden Bird by adding to 
and emphasizing the affectivity of the sculpture through, among other things, her 
particularly concrete use of language:  
 
 
As if 
some patient peasant God 
had rubbed and rubbed 
the Alpha and Omega  
of Form 
into a lump of metal 
 
A naked orientation 
unwinged  unplumed 
   —the ultimate rhythm 
has lopped the extremities 
of crest and claw 
from 
the nucleus of flight13 
 
 
The materiality of Loy’s poetics, the sonic qualities of the words and word 
order she uses, sets up “Brancusi’s Golden Bird” with an affective force that makes 
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itself felt in the body of the reader. The materiality of these words or sounds as 
they land on the reading or listening body refer the reader or listener back to an 
image of Brancusi’s original sculpture. As Ellen Keck Stauder comments on these 
two stanzas, Loy uses repetitions of sounds (“b” and “p” in patient peasant rubbed 
rubbed, “m” and “l” in Alpha and Omega, Form, lump, metal) to create sound 
patterns that form an extremely tactile surface to the poem: 
 
These many sound patterns overlap and are intertwined with each other, giving 
the effect of waves of sound patterns constantly curling back on themselves. 
The effect of Loy’s consonance and assonance is a web of interlocking 
sounds and resonances that gives the poem a surface texture much like the 
polished brass of Brancusi’s surface.14  
Loy responds in kind to Brancusi’s sculpture because she creates affecting 
images that take up and extend the affective patterns that Brancusi’s sculpture 
produces. The metallic surface that Loy’s poetics give rise to, its resonance in the 
ear and taste in the mouth, is at once a vessel for Golden Bird’s affective traits, but 
also an augmentation of Golden Bird’s affectivity. The relationship opened up 
between Loy’s poem and Brancusi’s sculpture functions, therefore, as an 
extension, or complication, of the latter’s affectivity. Loy’s poem takes certain 
affective motivations of Golden Bird and extends them into a poetic body. To this 
extent Loy’s poem does not aim to offer an intelligible description of Brancusi’s 
sculpture but rather it aims to evoke and extend the former’s affectivity through a 
particular use of language and sound.15 In this way Loy’s extension of Brancusi’s 
sculpture through the writing of her poem has the effect of complicating our own 
affective relation with Golden Bird. And since, under Spinoza’s ontology, the effects 
define an individual rather than an individual defining its effects, then the effects 
that constitute Golden Bird’s individuality are correspondingly changed through 
the reader’s or listener’s experience of Loy’s poem. In other words, Golden Bird is 
altered in its individuality through our experience of Loy’s poem: Loy’s poem 
complicates our affective experience of Brancusi’s sculpture and in so doing alters 
its individuality by transforming the effects it has in the world.  
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III 
In the above I argued that under Spinoza’s relational theory of the 
individual, Loy’s poem actively participates in the individuality of Golden Bird by 
altering the latter’s affectivity. But the mutability and relationality of works of art 
and literature are not unprecedented ideas in art theory, and nor are they 
historical anomalies. Loy is often considered a “futurist” poet, though with certain 
caveats to her commitment to various futurist theses. 16  At the turn of the 
twentieth century, as modernity made itself increasingly present in everyday life, 
various avant-garde movements began to emerge and make themselves felt. These 
included such movements as futurism, Dada, surrealism, vorticism, imagism, and 
others, which sought to orientate and situate both artist and artwork in a 
developing modern world. Taking a stance against the symbolists’ withdrawal 
from what they saw as the “coarseness” of modernity, the futurists aimed to 
immerse themselves in the immediacy of its technological revolution. As F. T. 
Marinetti writes in his essay “We Abjure Our Symbolist Masters, the Last Lovers 
of the Moon”: “Our Symbolist fathers had a passion we consider ridiculous: a 
passion for eternal things, a desire for immortal, imperishable master works.”17  
Contrary to this love of the eternal and the unchanging, Marinetti 
continues, the futurists seek to immerse themselves in the unmediated presence 
of modernity and take up in their art “that of becoming, the perishable, the 
transitory, and the ephemeral” (“LMM,” p. 75). From an adulation of the work of 
art as transcendent of the world and fixed in its being comes an engagement with 
the things and experiences of a rapidly evolving modernity that is changeable and 
perishable. The art of the futurists was volatile, fleeting, and open to constant 
modification from the active and fluctuating modern world that surrounded it. In 
short, the art of the futurists, whether poem, collage, or performance, was 
fundamentally relational. 
 While Loy’s relationship to the futurist movement was complex and 
mutable, she is nevertheless often considered through the lens of futurism 
because of her linguistic technique, relationship with Marinetti, and her own 
“Aphorisms on Futurism.” As I have suggested above, Loy’s “Brancusi’s Golden 
Bird” can be seen to emphasize a key tenet of all futurist manifestos, a tenet that 
can also be found in Brancusi’s sculpture itself: that of dynamism and openness to 
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the world.18 The idea of the dynamic—distinguishable in both the poem’s form 
and content—situates Loy’s poem and Brancusi’s sculpture in relation to the 
futurists’ hostility toward the static and definable, and their reverence, like many 
avant-gardists at the time, for the open and contingent in the work of art. As the 
early Dada performances at Cabaret Voltaire showed, a common feature in much 
avant-garde art was not to think of a work of art as a record of a finished idea or 
thought. Rather, their works were to be seen as a dynamic and ongoing 
relationship of mutual affectivity between the artist and audience and, ultimately, 
between the artist and the ever-mutating modern world.  
In this respect, the work of Loy and other avant-garde artists was radically 
“open,” in the sense that Umberto Eco theorizes the work of art in The Open Work. 
According to Eco, modern works of art are “open” insofar as they are in a continual 
process of completion by the perceiver who engages with them. But more than 
this, Eco suggests that the very nature of the modern work of art is that it actively 
seeks out participation in itself; that modern works of art somehow “invite” the 
viewer to insert something of themselves into the very being of the work of art.19 
According to Eco, then, works of art are radically open, in the sense that they are 
in a continual process of completion by the perceiver; but they are also 
fundamentally active insofar as they actively seek out their completion through 
the various relations they undergo. Here the literary-artistic body is once again 
understood as relational and dynamic in its individuality, since it appears 
constituted in its being through the active relations its body gives rise to. This 
means that for Eco, and like Spinoza’s theory of the individual, as a site of relation 
the individuality of a work of art is never fixed and determinate but is continually 
modified by the various relations it stimulates and undergoes.  
The dynamic nature of the work of art means that Loy’s poem participates 
in, extends, and alters Brancusi’s sculpture, and also it is possible in this way to 
understand Loy’s poem as a truly Spinozist encounter with a work of art. With 
“Brancusi’s Golden Bird” Loy does not set up any proper names or normative 
prescriptions between the art object and herself; she does not attempt to situate 
Golden Bird within strict normative parameters, the consequence of which would 
be to limit the work in its affectivity through a determination of it as this or that 
kind of thing. Rather, Loy’s poem actively seeks agreement and assimilation with 
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Golden Bird, and in so doing she achieves a participation with it that 
simultaneously complicates and extends the sculpture, poem, and perceiver.  
In this essay I have argued that the understanding of a work of art in its 
dynamic individuality must be at the center of any Spinozist engagement with art. 
Under Spinozism, the work of art must be thought ethologically, that is, through 
the effects to which it gives rise as a particularly active and reactive site of relation. 
To ask what a work of art gives rise to, to ask what relations a poem or painting 
effects, is to engage with a work of art through the central principles of Spinozism; 
it is in this final sense that Spinoza’s ethological ethics can contribute to aesthetics, 
art theory, and literary theory. Considered through certain key tenets of Spinoza’s 
ontology, and particularly through his relational theory of individuality, works of 
art and literature can be seen as active parts of nature that are continuously 
shaped and reshaped by their surroundings, but which in turn shape and reshape 
the various things they relate to. Far from being a hindrance for a productive 
engagement with art, Spinoza’s ontological framework allows Loy’s poem and 
Brancusi’s sculpture to emerge in their true relationality as individuals intimately 
involved in each other’s being.  
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